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INTRODUCTION
In late 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) learned of
precarious cases of pneumonia in Wuhan City, China. Soon after,
authorities reported that a novel coronavirus (COVID-19) was the cause.
The coronavirus, known as SARS-CoV2 (Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome Coronavirus 2), began to spread rapidly across the globe. On
March 11, 2020, the WHO declared the novel coronavirus outbreak a
pandemic. Two years later, the coronavirus has infected individuals in
* Antonios Kouroutakis is an Assistant Professor at IE University. Dr. Kouroutakis graduated from
U.C.L.A. and University of Oxford. A short version of the article was published on the IACL blog
[https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2020-posts/2020/3/24/inaction-as-a-state-response-to-the-coronavirusoutbreak] and it has been cited by the Supreme Court of Brazil (Supremo Tribunal Federal ADI 6421
MC / DF).
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more than 225 countries and territories. Over four hundred million people
have contracted coronavirus disease (hereinafter COVID-19), and more
than six million people have died.1
The pandemic’s rapid spread across the world put pressure on
governments to respond. Public health was at stake. The mortality of the
new virus was high—estimated at up to 1%2 and much more fatal than the
common influenza while the transmission intensity and the spread of the
virus were much faster.3 To put it simply, the COVID-19 pandemic, during
its first waves, “[was] the most serious seen in a respiratory virus since the
1918 H1N1 influenza pandemic.”4
An extraordinary situation emerged as a result of the pre-variant
virus’s mortality rate and the transmission intensity, the lack of medicine
and vaccination, the need for hospitalization, and the scarce resources of
the health systems around the world.5 One infected person at a dinner or
party could spread the virus to rest of the attendants. For example, the well
reported incident from New Jersey. In early March 2020, the members of
an Italian American family attended an ordinary gathering. Two weeks
later, the family matriarch and three siblings died, another three were
1. Worldometer offers real-time world statistics on COVID-19. See generally Worldometer,
https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/8U9R-QD6L].
2. According to a report published in February 2020, the case fatality ratio (CFR) was estimated
in the range 1.2%–5.6%. However, the mortality rate from country to country varied, as it depends on
the statistical methods and the “sensitivity of the divergent surveillance systems to detect cases of
differing levels of severity of the illness.” See Ilaria Dorigatti, Lucy Okell, Anne Cori, Natsuko Imai,
Marc Baguelin, Sangeeta Bhatia, Adhiratha Boonyasiri, Zulma Cucunubá, Gina Cuomo-Dannenburg,
Rich FitzJohn, Han Fu, Katy Gaythorpe , Arran Hamlet, Wes Hinsley, Nan Hong , Min Kwun, Daniel
Laydon, Gemma Nedjati-Gilani, Steven Riley, Sabine van Elsland, Erik Volz, Haowei Wang,
Raymond Wang, Caroline Walters , Xiaoyue Xi, Christl Donnelly, Azra Ghani & Neil Ferguson,
REPORT
4:
SEVERITY
OF
2019-NOVEL
CORONAVIRUS
(NCOV)
1
(2020),
https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/mrc-gida/2020-02-10-COVID19Report-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD8E-C2ZM] [hereinafter REPORT 4].
3. A report published in January 2020 estimated that each patient infected 2.6 new people.
Natsuko Imai, Anne Cori, Ilaria Dorigatti, Marc Baguelin, Christl A. Donnelly, Steven Riley & Neil
M.
Ferguson,
REPORT
3:
TRANSMISSIBILITY
OF
2019-NCOV
5
(2020),
https://www.imperial.ac.uk/mrc-global-infectious-disease-analysis/covid-19/report-3transmissibility-of-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/2ZTQ-HAP6] [hereinafter REPORT 3].
4. See Neil M. Ferguson, Daniel Laydon, Gemma Nedjati-Gilani, Natsuko Imai, Kylie Ainslie,
Marc Baguelin, Sangeeta Bhatia, Adhiratha Boonyasiri, Zulma Cucunubá, Gina Cuomo-Dannenburg,
Amy Dighe, Ilaria Dorigatti, Han Fu, Katy Gaythorpe, Will Green, Arran Hamlet, Wes Hinsley, Lucy
C. Okell, Sabine van Elsland, Hayley Thompson, Robert Verity, Erik Volz, Haowei Wang, Yuanrong
Wang, Patrick G.T. Walker, Caroline Walters, Peter Winskill, Charles Whittaker, Christl A. Donnelly,
Steven Riley & Azra C Ghani, REPORT 9: IMPACT OF NON-PHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS (NPIS)
TO
REDUCE COVID-19 MORTALITY
AND
HEALTHCARE
DEMAND
1
(2020),
https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-fellowships/ImperialCollege-COVID19-NPI-modelling-16-03-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4AM-QJYD] [hereinafter
REPORT 9].
5. See generally REPORT 4, supra note 2, for more details on the severity of the COVID-19 and
the unprecedented challenges to the healthcare system.

86

Seattle University Law Review SUpra

[Vol. 45:84

hospitalized in a critical condition, and more than a dozen others were
infected.6
As a result, ordinary tools in the policymaker’s toolbox, in developed
and developing countries alike, were unable to face the exigency of the
situation. In particular, there was an urgency for the passing of new laws
tailored to meet the requirement of the health crisis, which was
incompatible with the slow-paced law-making procedures. On top of that,
lawmaking bodies were unable to assemble as the risk of infection was
very high among the representatives.
Some states balanced basic rights and freedoms, such as the freedom
of movement and assembly, with public health measures by adopting
emergency measures. These emergency measures ranged from imposing
lockdowns to more specific bans and restrictions.
Thus, the strategy for mitigation and suppression of the virus
included measures such as the policy of social or physical distancing, night
curfews, travel bans, quarantines, mandatory testing certificates, limited
capacity for indoor activities, and mandatory use of protective masks.7 For
instance, on February 23rd, the Italian government issued, in terms of
Article 77 of the Italian Constitution, an executive decree8 delegating the
authority to the head of the government to issue further executive decrees
in response to the crisis caused by COVID-19. The Italian government was
able to issue such a decree under Article 77 of the Italian Constitution. In
like manner, on March 14th, the Spanish government activated a so-called
“state of alarm” with the issuance of a Royal Decree 9 under Article 116(2)
of the Spanish Constitution and the Organic Law of States of Alarm
Exceptions and Situations Act.
Social distancing means that people are instructed to keep a safe
distance, about six feet, between themselves and other people not from the
same household in both indoor and outdoor spaces.9 Practically speaking,
daily activities such as attending school, sports, and religious activities,

6. J. K. Elliott, Mom, Sister, Two Brothers Gone: How Coronavirus ‘Decimated’ a New Jersey
Family GLOB. NEWS (Mar. 20, 2020), https://globalnews.ca/news/6707275/coronavirus-new-jerseyfamily/ [https://perma.cc/JAU4-P9N6].
7. REPORT 9, supra note 4, at 1 (“Two fundamental strategies are possible: (a) mitigation, which
focuses on slowing but not necessarily stopping epidemic spread – reducing peak healthcare demand
while protecting those most at risk of severe disease from infection, and (b) suppression, which aims
to reverse epidemic growth, reducing case numbers to low levels and maintaining that situation
indefinitely.”).
8.
DECRETO-LEGGE
23
febbraio
2020,
n.6,
https://www.normattiva.it/urires/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legge:2020-02-23;6!vig= [https://perma.cc/BG8W-76Z7].
9. See How to Protect Yourself & Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Feb. 25, 2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html
[https://perma.cc/9USC-KUEY].
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working in an office, dining at a restaurant, or using public transportation
became impracticable.
Interestingly, the global reach of the virus allowed researchers and
academics to record and compare the policy implemented by different
countries. In particular, the response to the pandemic in each country or
region was dependent on (1) the number of infections and (2) the
institutional capacity, i.e., available healthcare material and available
intensive care units. However, when the pandemic erupted during the
second quarter of 2020, the scientific uncertainty regarding the virus, in
combination with the lack of experience and the minimal preparedness,
led to the activation of emergency regimes and the implementation of
emergency regulations.
However, during the first wave of the pandemic, some countries,
such as the United Kingdom (U.K.)10 and Sweden11, did not implement
any emergency regulations. The governments in these countries initially
followed a business-as-usual policy.
Such a reaction—in practice an omission—was an emergency
situation paradox. From a public policy perspective, there are two main
reactions to a state of emergency that attract the interest of academics and
practitioners. The first and most common is the “overreaction” when
policymakers adopt regulations that disproportionately burden the public’s
rights and freedoms. The second, which is not as common but is the subject
of this Article, is omission. In this Article, omission refers to
policymakers’ failure to detect the exigency of a situation and failure to
enact emergency measures to mitigate the impact of the emergency.
That said, the omission that took place in the U.K. and Sweden
during the first wave was a policy option, an intentional omission.
Lawmakers and policymakers decided not to implement an emergency
regulation. Interestingly, this reaction from the U.K. and Sweden
underpins a neglected aspect of the emergency framework, a novel aspect
in the omission in a state of emergency. Omission, like a written

10. The policy first implemented in the U.K. was in practice “accepting that herd immunity by
infection” as the inevitable outcome. HOUSE OF COMMONS, HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE AND SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEES, CORONAVIRUS: LESSONS LEARNED TO DATE, SIXTH REPORT OF
THE HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE COMMITTEE AND THIRD REPORT OF THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
COMMITTEE OF SESSION 2021–22 (U.K.).
11. For a discussion of the so-called Swedish exceptionalism see Stefan Baral, Rebecca
Chandler, Ruth Gil Prieto, Sunetra Gupta, Sharmistha Mishra & Martin Kulldorff, Leveraging
Epidemiological Principles to Evaluate Sweden’s COVID-19 Response, 54 ANNALS OF
EPIDEMIOLOGY,
Feb.
2021,
at
21,
25
(2021),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7682427/pdf/main.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SZGPRJY].
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regulation, produces legal effects.12 The act of omission is thoroughly
examined in the administrative law area;13 however, in the context of
emergency laws, there is a paucity of literature. Moreover, the omission in
emergencies raises the question of whether emergency powers are too
concentrated and monopolized in an executive branch’s hands.
That said, the key question is what constitutional mechanisms to
compel action exist in an emergency omission. In this Article, I seek to
answer that question and inspire reflection on what constitutional
mechanisms exist to compel the executive to take action in an emergency.
I will argue that there are three approaches to compel action and avoid
emergency omission and that the best approach is resolution through the
political process.
The first approach is based on the constitutional design of the
executive power. In most unitary countries, the emergency power is
concentrated in the hands of the central government. This is a system I
refer to as the monopoly of emergency powers. On the other hand, in
countries with multilevel governments such as in federal and devolved
states, the two-tier executive, at the national and local level, allows
constitution designers to allocate to both executives’ emergency powers.
Hence, if one tier stays inactive, the other might take action to regulate
emergencies.
The second approach puts courts at the heart of the solution with
judicial review. People can compel action via ordinary judicial review. It
is self-evident that governments are expected to care and are expected to
act in times of emergency. Such expectation is based on the political
relationship between representatives and voters. Voters elect their
representatives, and they entrust them with a democratic mandate. But as
Locke has put it, voters expect that themselves, their liberty, and property
will be preserved.14 In addition, Machiavelli remarked that “[s]ensible
rulers and well-run states have always done all they can not to drive the
nobles to despair and to keep the people happy and satisfied”15, which
implied a duty to care.
On top of that, in some countries like Spain, the constitutional text
recognizes a general provision prescribing the obligation of the state to
protect the rights of the people.16 In others, such as the United States, the
12. However, some scholars criticize treating positive acts and omissions in the same way. For
more details, see JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES (1977). Moreover, the last
part of this article will show that courts treat omissions differently than acts.
13. See Glover, supra note 12; see also TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT (1999).
14. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 131 (1689).
15. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 74 (Tim Parks ed., 2014).
16. See CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [C.E.] [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 27, 1978, B.O.E n.116
(Spain). For instance, the “recoursos de amparo.” Id.
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duty to care and a duty to act has a very limited scope.17 However, while
lawmakers tend to enact policies via action and omissions cumulatively,
in practice courts are less likely to find state authorities liable and
accountable for non-feasance. On top of that, the deference that judges
show in times of emergency would deter the chances for judges to compel
emergency action.
Based on these approaches, this article will argue that the third
approach, the political process, is the best resolution to omission.
In Part I of this Article, I will first elaborate on the legal theory of
emergencies in the context of government, and I will focus on the specific
emergency measures that different countries enacted to address the
pandemic. In Part II of this Article, I will provide examples of countries
that did not enact any emergency regulation during the first wave of the
coronavirus pandemic, and I will use these examples to elaborate on the
concept of emergency omission. Finally, I will conclude with an analysis
of the available remedies to compel executive action. In particular, I will
focus on the emergency authority, and by examining cases from Brazil and
Spain, I will highlight how the duopoly of emergency powers between the
central and the local governments led to action. Then, I will discuss the
role that citizens and the courts can play via judicial review against
emergency omission, and elaborate on the two inherent limitations: first,
the practice of deference and second, the tendency of the courts not to find
state authorities liable for omission.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF EMERGENCIES AND THE PANDEMIC
A. Legal Theory on Emergencies
According to the fracture mechanics, materials are characterized by
their resistance to fracture. What distinguishes brittle materials from
ductile materials is the ability of the material to undergo plastic
deformation before the fracture. In practice, the ductile fracture is
preferred in most applications because materials with a relatively high
extensive ability for plastic deformation before they crack absorb more
energy to tolerate stress before fracture. 18
This analog can be useful when thinking about constitutionals.
Constitutional drafters’ paramount aim is to create enduring constitutions
that have the ability to sustain stress and pressure to avoid constitutional
17. The U.S. Due Process Clause protects the right to personal security of the people incarcerated
in state institutions. See e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); DeShaney v. Winnebago
Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
18. For more details about brittle and ductile fracture see RAYMOND A. HIGGINS, THE
PROPERTIES OF ENGINEERING MATERIALS 384 (Industrial Press, 2d ed., 1994).

90

Seattle University Law Review SUpra

[Vol. 45:84

mortality.19 In other words, constitutions are not simply rulebooks but are
artificial materials that define the structure, performance, properties, and
processes in the legal order.20
When drafters create a constitution with procedural provisions such
as the lawmaking power of a legislature alongside institutional guarantees
such as checks and balances and human rights protections, they make the
legal order rigid and solid. But in times of emergency—an age-old
problem21—constitutions, like materials, need flexibility and the ability to
absorb energy to tolerate stress and avoid fracture to respond to national
and international emergencies.
Constitution designers incorporate such flexibility in a number of
constitutional provisions that provide for a special emergency regime that
affects the separation of powers, constitutional guarantees, and rights.
Indeed, constitutional provisions in numerous constitutions prescribe for a
deviation from specific rules and procedures upon several conditions and
constraints.
At the same time, lawmakers with ordinary legislative powers create
permanent agencies responsible for emergency planning and executing
those plans when necessary. Lawmakers also set expectations about
cooperation and partnership between different agencies, such as
governmental and regional authorities, non-governmental organizations,
and volunteers.
Constitutional theory and political philosophy have dedicated a
plethora of articles and books to the issue of “states of emergency.”22 Carl
Schmitt ignited the discussion by famously stating that the “[s]overeign is
he who decides on the exception.”23 Schmitt argued that during states of
emergency, the rule of law has no place because the powers of the
sovereign need to be endless and unlimited to address an emergency.

19. On the issue of constitutional mortality, see ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG, & JAMES
MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (CUP) 12246.
20. Xenophon Contiades & Alkemene Fotiadou, On Resilience of Constitutions. What Makes
Constitutions Resistant to External Shocks? 9 VIENNA J. ON INT’L CONST. L. 3 (2015).
21. On emergencies during the roman period see GREGORY KUNG GOLDEN, EMERGENCY
MEASURES: CRISIS AND RESPONSE IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 89 (2011); for more details on the
emergency configuration in the Roman period see CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 15 (Princeton University Press
1948).
22. See generally Antonios Kouroutakis, The Virtues of Sunset Clauses in Relation to
Constitutional Authority, 41 STATUTE L. REV. 16 (2020) (the state of emergency is a concept opposed
to the state of normality).
23. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY
5 (George Schwab ed., 2005).
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After the tragedy of the Weimar Republic,24 liberal constitutional
theory recognized three main responses to emergencies.25 The first
common approach is the ‘accommodation’ model, with Bruce Ackerman
as one of its prominent proponents.26 This approach allows policymakers
to adopt tailored laws to accommodate a crisis. The departure from
ordinary legislation—legislation that, in other words, regulates the life of
the people in times of normality—is regarded as necessary because
ordinary legislation is considered inadequate to respond to a state of
emergency.
The incorporation of a state of emergency provision into
constitutional documents has been described, in liberal constitutional
theory, as a Trojan horse and as a normalization of the state of exception.
Hence, Dyzenhaus proposed another method, the “business as usual”
model.27 According to this approach, policymakers simply employ
ordinary laws from their existing legal arsenal when dealing with
emergencies. States, therefore, rely on mechanisms such as legislation
related to war and crime.28
Finally, the third approach is the so-called “extra-legal measures”
model. According to Gross, a proponent of this model, this approach
presumes that public officials may act extra-legally when emergency
measures are necessary for protecting the nation. However, this model
does provide for, and its defenders acknowledge, that officials taking
extra-legal action may be held legally or politically accountable for those
actions, should they be proven wrongful.29 Similar to this model is the
“extraconstitutional” model.30 Inspired by the Korematsu case, originator
Mark Tushnet argues that emergency powers should be treated as
extraconstitutional and subject to judicial and political post scrutiny.31 In
fact, this model is encapsulated in Dicey’s analysis of the use of Habeas

24. Kouroutakis, supra note 22, at 23.
25. The liberal response to emergencies is based on the idea of rule of law constrained emergency
powers. The alternative model would be unconstrained emergency powers as perceived by Schmitt.
See Schmitt, supra note 23, at 8.
26. See generally Bruce Ackerman, Essay, The Emergency Constitution,113 YALE L.J. 1029
(2004).
27. See DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY
(2006).
28. Id.
29. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional.
112 YALE L.J 1011, 1023 (2003). For criticism over this third approach see David Dyzenhaus, The
State of Emergency in Legal Theory, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 65 (Michael
Yew Meng Hor, Victor Vridar Ramraj & Kent Roach eds., 2009); Ackerman, supra note 26, at 1041.
30. See Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003
WIS. L. REV. 273–307 (2003).
31. Id. at 306.
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Corpus Suspension Acts in combination with retrospective Indemnity Acts
as an alternative to the imposition of martial law.32
B. Adoption of COVID-19 Emergency Measures
Historically, emergencies were at stake in times of external and
internal risks, such as in times of war, mayhem, riots, and public disorder.
However, the scope of emergencies expanded, for instance, with the
massive scale terrorist attacks on September 11 and recently with the
COVID-19 pandemic. Emergencies have the following four
characteristics according to the European Commission of Human Rights,
which describes the features of such an emergency. In particular:
(1) It must be actual or imminent. (2) Its effects must involve the
whole nation. (3) The continuance of the organised life of the
community must be threatened. (4) The crisis or danger must be
exceptional, in that the normal measures or restrictions, permitted by
the Convention for the maintenance of public safety, health and order,
are plainly inadequate.33

Constitutional provisions and statutes cover a wide range of
emergency situations, provide distinct emergency response frameworks,
and bestow a wide range of executive powers upon policymakers so they
may respond accordingly.34 Emergency constitutional provisions, in
general, also usually use vague terms, such as “protecting the civilian

32. A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 237
(10th ed., 1959).
33. Den. v. Greece, App. No. 3321/67, Nor. v. Greece, App. No. 3322/67, Swed. v. Greece, App.
No. 3323/67, Neth. v. Greece, App. No. 3344/67, 1 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. in The Greek
Case, 1 COUNCIL OF EUR., 1, 70 (1970).
34. See e.g., the Constitution of Spain, which regulates in Article 116 three different types of
emergencies with three distinct procedures.
1. An organic law shall regulate the states of alarm, emergency and siege (martial law) and
the corresponding competences and limitations. 2. A state of alarm shall be declared by the
Government, by means of a decree decided upon by the Council of Ministers, for a
maximum period of fifteen days. The Congress of Deputies shall be informed and must
meet immediately for this purpose. Without their authorisation the said period my not be
extended. The decree shall specify the territorial area to which the effects of the
proclamation shall apply. 3. A state of emergency shall be declared by the Government by
means of a decree decided upon by the Council of Ministers, after prior authorisation by
the Congress of Deputies. The authorisation for and declaration of a state of emergency
must specifically state the effects thereof, the territorial area to which it is to apply and its
duration, which may not exceed thirty days, subject to extension for a further thirty-day
period, with the same requirements. 4. A state of siege (martial law) shall be declared by
absolute majority of the Congress of Deputies, exclusively at the proposal of the
Government. Congress shall determine its territorial extension, duration and terms.
Constitution of Spain, Article 116. C.E, B.O.E. n.116, Dec. 27, 1978 (Spain).

2022]

Inaction as a State Response

93

population,”35 “public order,”36 “the independence of the Nation,”37
“extraordinary circumstances of an urgent and unforeseeable need,”38
natural disasters,39 giving policymakers further discretion and flexibility
to act.40
There are several reasons why the pandemic is considered a situation
requiring emergency measures. To begin with, the pandemic is a state of
exception, as Agamben describes it,41 and it is a concept opposed to the
state of normality; It is an extraordinary situation, as viruses, without
vaccines and medicines, and with such easy transmission are extremes way
outside the state of normality. They are not part of ordinary life. Second,
when hospitals were overwhelmed with patients once the number of
patients with COVID-19 increased substantially and the availability of the
ICU was eliminated, a sense of urgency and time pressure prevailed. Thus,
policymakers did not have the luxury of time to prepare and plan a
response according to ordinary procedures. Third, as the death tolls rise, a
general sense of the uncertainty and a lack of predictability of the
consequences prevails. Finally, the current status quo emergency is
expected to be reversible and temporary once the vaccine and medicines
work and bring results. Consequently, it is expected that such an extreme
situation as described above would trigger the emergency framework of
each country.
As the first wave of COVID-19 broke out, many states took swift
preventative emergency regulations based on public health concerns. For
instance, the Italian government issued, on February 23rd, in terms of
Article 77 of the Italian Constitution, an executive decree.42 This decree
has given Prime Minister Conte the authority to issue further executive

35. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], Art. 80a, translated by Federal Ministry of Justice,
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0424 [https://perma.cc/YH4EYPB7] (Ger.).
36. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] Art. 18 (Greece).
37. 1958 CONST. art. 16 (France).
38. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] Art. 44 (Greece).
39. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, Art. 11 (Braz.).
40. For more details about the utility of vague expressions, see Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg,
Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional Design (U. of Chi. Pub. L. & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 389, 2012).
41. For more details on the state of exception, see GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION
1.1 (Kevin Attell trans., 2003).
42. See DECRETO-LEGGE [Decree-Law] 23 Febbraio 2020, n.6 (Feb. 23, 2020),
https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legge:2020-02-23;6!vig=
[https://perma.cc/97WW-6ZFA].
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decrees in response to the crisis caused by the pandemic.43 The President
of the United States, on March 13th, declared a state of emergency in
alignment with sections 201 and 301 of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1601).44 Similarly, the Spanish government, on March 14th,
activated a so-called “state of alarm” with the issuance of Royal Decree
463/2020,45 issued in terms of Article 116(2) of the Spanish Constitution
and the Organic Law of States of Alarm, Exceptions, and Situations Act.46
In practice, policymakers implemented the medical recommendation
for social distancing by imposing lockdowns of the non-essential parts of
the economy and by imposing people to stay at home.47 This meant that
people’s freedom to exercise their religion, their freedom of assembly to
demonstrate, their right to work, or their liberty to go for a walk was
constrained. Such measures were challenged before the courts, and some
were upheld, but others were found unconstitutional. For instance, in
Germany, the Constitutional Court held that the new pandemic-related
rules could not limit the right to hold political protests.48 Meanwhile, in
the U.S. the Supreme Court held that pandemic-related rules may impose
restrictions on worship.49
Scholars and judges have criticized emergency measures from
several perspectives. For instance, Dyzenhaus argues that such temporary
measures will spread, and the temporary measures will become
permanent, threatening civil liberties.50 Justice Brennan has raised the
43.
A
list
of
Executive
Decrees
is
available
at
http://www.governo.it/it/approfondimento/coronavirus-la-normativa/14252 [https://perma.cc/4JSLNSGH].
44. See Donald J. Trump, Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the
Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-nationalemergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak
[https://perma.cc/Q5HJSAB8].
45. See Ministerio de la Presidencia, Relaciones con las Cortes y Memoria Democrática,
BOLETÍN OFICIAL DEL ESTADO [OFICIAL GAZETTE] (Mar. 14, 2020) (Spain),
https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2020/03/14/pdfs/BOE-A-2020-3692.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G2D4CS3A].
46. See Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 de Junio, de los Estados de Alarma, Excepción y Sitio,
LEGISLACIÓN CONSOLIDADA (June 5, 1981) (Spain), https://www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/1981/BOE-A1981-12774-consolidado.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9Z7-85YB].
47. About the policies implemented in Germany to face the pandemic see Pierre Thielbörger,
Germany – Federalism in Action, in MATTHIAS C KETTEMANN & KONRAD LACHMAYER,
PANDEMOCRACY IN EUROPE POWER, PARLIAMENTS AND PEOPLE IN TIMES OF COVID-19, at 95
(2021).
48. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Apr. 15, 2020, 1 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 828/20 (Ger.).
49. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 985 F.3d 1128, 1152 (2020).
50. See David Dyzenhaus, The Permanence of the Temporary: Can Emergency Powers Be
Normalized?, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA’S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL 21, 28
(Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach eds., 2001).
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issue of overreaction saying “[a]fter each perceived security crisis ended,
the United States has remorsefully realized that the abrogation of civil
liberties was unnecessary.”51
Justice Brennan’s concerns about overreactions to emergency
responses were seen in many countries’ responses to COVID-19. For
instance, Hungary and Indonesia both had responded with an overreaction.
In Hungary, a law was enacted to transfer tremendous powers to the
executive branch and several freedoms were thus unnecessarily
restricted.52 In Indonesia, an enacted emergency law deviated from
constitutional requirements regarding the budget bills and provided
immunity to government officials.53 While much ink has been spilled over
the proper reaction to emergencies, the scholarship has neglected the issue
of state inaction during emergencies. The following part will discuss the
case of inaction in a state of emergency.
II. EMERGENCY OMISSION AND HOW TO COMPEL ACTION
A. Inaction During Emergencies
The existing legal framework, which is meant to govern under
ordinary circumstances, cannot respond to an emergency’s special and
exceptional circumstances. Thus, a state emergency creates a need for
action, which may fall within the purview of the executive or legislative
branch.54 For instance, if there is intelligence that a terrorist attack is
developing, state authorities or policymakers might activate permanent
emergency protocols, such as mass surveillance, to prevent the attack, or
they might enact new emergency regulations such as a stay-at-home order
to mitigate its impact.
But what if the state authorities decide not to take action while an
emergency is looming? This is not a novel question. Indeed, Richard A.

51. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of
Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 11, 11 (1988).
52. Gábor Halmai, Gábor Mészáros & Kim Lane Scheppele, From Emergency to Disaster: How
Hungary’s Second Pandemic Emergency will Further Destroy the Rule of Law, VERFASSUNGSBLOG
(May 30, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/from-emergency-to-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/ZA8CKJNC].
53. Stefanus Hendrianto, Early Warning Signs of Abusive Constitutionalism in Indonesia:
Pandemic
as
Pretext,
INT’L
J.
CONST.
L.
BLOG
(June
20,
2020),
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2020/06/early-warning-signs-of-abusive-constitutionalism-inindonesia-pandemic-as-pretext/ [https://perma.cc/5F78-CBER].
54. For instance, the U.S. Congress has the authority to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus, or
to “provide for calling forth Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 15. For more details see Antonios
E. Kouroutakis, Separation of Powers and the War on Terror- An Analysis of the Role of Its Institution,
42 BRACTON L.J. 27, 31 (2010).
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Posner stressed that during emergencies, the core problem is not the
overreaction but the lack of action.55 Specifically, according to Posner,
the lesson of history is that officials habitually exaggerate dangers to
the nation’s security. But the lesson of history is the opposite. It is
because officials have repeatedly and disastrously underestimated
these dangers that our history is as violent as it is. Consider such
underestimated dangers as that of secession, which led to the Civil
War; of a Japanese attack on the United States, which led to the
disaster at Pearl Harbor; of Soviet espionage in the 1940s, which
accelerated the Soviet Union’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and
emboldened Stalin to encourage North Korea’s invasion of South
Korea; of the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba, which
precipitated the Cuban missile crisis; . . . of the Tet Offensive of
1968; of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the subsequent taking of
American diplomats as hostages. . . .56

Though the lack of action may occur when policymakers
underestimate the magnitude of an emergency,57 emergency inaction or
omission is different. Emergency inaction occurs when the decision
makers are aware of the existence of an emergency but deliberately do not
deal with it. Several reasons, such as political or economic motivations,
explain emergency inaction. This conscious decision to not act is
nevertheless an action. For instance, in 1982, when Argentina invaded and
occupied the Falkland Islands, which are British Overseas Territory in the
South Atlantic, the British Prime Minister was advised not to take action
to avoid a war.58 Eventually, the British Prime Minister took diplomatic
action, and a series of emergency powers were exercised in connection
with the operation to recover the Falkland Islands.59 Thus, in this example,
inaction when it is an intentional decision based on facts and evidence,
functions as a type of action because it mirrors policy actions’ principles
and conditions. The term “inaction” differs from the term “inertia” because
inaction implies intention. In contrast, the latter implies the tendency to
55. Richard A. Posner, The Truth About Our Liberties, in RIGHTS VS. PUBLIC SAFETY AFTER
9/11: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 24, 26 (Amitai Etzioni & Jason H. Marsh eds., 2003).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. For instance, Reagan pleaded with Thatcher not to take military actions for Falklands. See
Record of Telephone Conversation Between President Reagan and the Prime Minister at 1840 Hours
on
Thursday
(May
13,
1982),
https://ee9da88eff6f462f2d6b873dc3788ab15d5cbb1e3fe45dbec9b4.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/820513%20MTRR%20telcon%20PREM19-0627%20f150.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7VY-X8RN].
59. For a detailed list of statutory powers exercised by Ministers in connection with the Falkland
Islands see Falkland Islands, 25 Oct. 1982, HC Deb (1982) vol. 29 c257W(Written Answers to
Commons by Prime Minister) (U.K.), https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/writtenanswers/1982/oct/25/falkland-islands [https://perma.cc/7KER-RZXH].
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perpetuate existing policy options and procedures, which is more similar
to the lack of an action policy approach. Technically, emergency inaction
is a form of the “business as usual” approach, but one that can be defined
as competent authorities choosing inaction when a crisis is looming.
The initial responses of the U.K. and Sweden to the COVID-19
outbreak are examples of emergency inaction. In Sweden, the government
did not act by imposing emergency orders like quarantine mandates or
curfews to limit the spread of the disease.60 Instead, Sweden acted through
non-emergency processes, especially recommendations, to address the
coronavirus emergency. First, it relied on the existing delegation of power
to limit public gatherings to five hundred people, but later reduced
gatherings to fifty people and ordered university and high school teaching
to move online.61 Second, it issued recommendations, rather than
mandates, to the citizens “to maintain ‘social distancing,’ in all public
places and on public transport.”62
Similarly, the U.K. government did not respond to the COVID-19
outbreak with emergency mandates.63 It did not introduce emergency
measures of the kind adopted by many other countries, such as travel and
free movement restrictions, the closure of schools and universities, and
bans on large gatherings. It limited its action to a series of
recommendations for topics such as social distancing and travel advice.64
The Swedish policy and the initial U.K. policy were informed by an
assumption that herd immunity would stop the spread of the virus.65 Herd
immunity is achieved when a sufficient portion of a population develops
immunity from infection, offering incidental protection to non-immune
members.66 Accordingly, the decision to not impose emergency mandates
60. For more details about the reaction by Sweden, see Julia Dahlqvist & Jane Reichel, Swedish
Constitutional Response to the Coronavirus Crisis: The Odd One Out?, in PANDEMOCRACY IN
EUROPE: POWER, PARLIAMENTS AND PEOPLE IN TIMES OF COVID-19, at 135 (2021).
61. Iain Cameron & Anna Jonsson-Cornell, Sweden and COVID 19: A Constitutional
Perspective, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (May 7, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/sweden-and-covid-19-aconstitutional-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/4JM9-XQUW].
62. Id.
63. About the detailed response in the U.K., see Robert Thomas, Virus Governance in the United
Kingdom, in PANDEMOCRACY IN EUROPE: POWER, PARLIAMENTS AND PEOPLE IN TIMES OF COVID19, at 71, 73 (2021).
64. See Guidance Staying at Home and Away from Others (Social Distancing), GOV.UK (last
visited May. 20, 2022), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/full-guidance-on-staying-athome-and-away-from-others/full-guidance-on-staying-at-home-and-away-from-others.
65. See Sarah Boseley, New Data, New Policy: Why UK’s Coronavirus Strategy Changed,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/16/new-data-new-policywhy-uks-coronavirus-strategy-has-changed [https://perma.cc/92FX-YNB9]; see also Nele
Brusselaers, David Steadson, Kelly Bjorklund, Sofia Breland & Jens Stillhoff Sörensen, Evaluation
of Science Advice During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Sweden, 9 HUMANS. & SOC. SCIS. COMMC’NS.
1 (2022).
66. See REPORT 9, supra note 4, at 3.
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to face the pandemic was intentional inaction. The goal of inaction was to
build herd immunity. Thus, the two policies are examples of emergency
inaction because they were justified by principles based on public health
rationales.
Another example of emergency inaction is the 2009 Greek financial
crisis.67 In 2009, the Greek government failed to adopt any measures to
reduce the country’s excessive primary budget deficit.68 The government
did not take any steps despite Greece’s economy being under surveillance
since 2005,69 and many European countries had fallen into recession
because of the 2008 global economic crisis. Instead of adopting emergency
measures, the government called for snap elections just a few months
before the economy’s collapse.70
In theory, emergency inaction is a legal fiction equivalent to an
omission in administrative law or a legislative omission.71 The actor, in
this case the governments, is not the source of the risk. As Honore has put
it, “[o]missions are therefore those not-doings that violate norms.”72 While
state authorities are liable for their actions as long as they are conducted
by and made in the exercise of power, for omissions, liability exists only
if state authorities are under a duty requiring them to act.
A state of emergency creates a distinct duty for the government to
act.73 First, governments have a distinct duty to act due to the nature of
emergencies. If governments do not act then the burden is transferred to
the individual. But, because emergencies are unusual events of such a
magnitude, no private entity has the resources to face them without
government support. Second, there is a contractual argument between
people and the government. Constitutions embody the values of the social

67. See Antonios E. Kouroutakis & Despina Glarou, Der Ökonomische Ausnahmezustand in
Griechenland. Was Ist Schief Gelaufen? (The Economic Crisis in Greece. What Went Wrong?), in
AUSNAHMEZUSTAND: THEORIEGESCHICHTE – ANWENDUNGEN – PERSPEKTIVEN, 199 (Matthias
Lemke ed., 2017).
68. Id.
69. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission Assesses Greek Stability Programme
and Compliance with Excessive Deficit Recommendations (Apr. 6, 2005) (on file with European
Commission).
70. See Antonios E. Kouroutakis & Despoina Glarou, Der Ökonomische Ausnahmezustand in
Griechenland, in AUSNAHMEZUSTAND: THEORIEGESCHICHTE – ANWENDUNGEN – PERSPEKTIVEN
199, [214] (Matthias Lemke ed. 2017).
71. According to a Venice Commission Report a “[l]egislative omissions occur in every country
and happen when Parliament, which had the duty to legislate, fails to ensure that the relevant and
necessary acts are passed and are complete, thereby leaving a legal gap, lacunae or vacuum in the legal
system.” General Report of the XIVth Congress of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts
on Problems of Legislative Omission in Constitutional Jurisprudence, VENICE COMM’N (Dec. 2008),
https://www.venice.coe.int/files/Bulletin/SpecBull-legislative-omission-e.pdf.
72. HONORÉ, supra note 13, at 43.
73. For the distinct duties theory see id. at 43–46, 54–60.
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contract both between the people and between the people and their
representatives. In such a contract, there is a tremendous transfer of power
to the executive in times of emergencies. Such wide power necessarily
implies a distinct duty.
Once we examined the concept of emergency inaction, it would be
of interest to examine whether there is a remedy for such emergency
inaction. Could citizens compel action via the courts? Could citizens ask
the courts to recognize the unconstitutionality of the omission and ask the
courts to compel action? The following part will shift its focus to how to
address these issues.
B. How to Compel Action? A Review of the Legal Basis
1. Monopoly of Emergency Powers and the Exception of Multi-level
Governance
In many countries, especially in unitary states, an imperfect
formulation of the separation of powers doctrine underpins the
development of the constitution. Unclear delegation of powers leads to
adopting provisions giving the executive branch a monopoly over a state’s
emergency response. Governments during emergencies have discretion on
how to react. In particular, they have discretion on the content, timing, and
duration of regulations. Likewise, the government has the discretion to act
or to stay inactive; since failing to include a constitutional mechanism
compelling the executive to act during emergencies allows the executive
to choose to remain inactive.
One example of the monopoly of the emergency powers exists in
states with federalism. In these systems of government,74 the duality of
executive power between federal and state government allows state
authorities to step in and take emergency actions in case the federal
government does not, and vice versa. For instance, in Brazil the federal
government insisted it would not adopt governmental policies against
COVID-19, but the state and municipal authorities enacted restrictions,
such as restrictions on public transport and schools.75 The constitutionality
of these measures was challenged in the courts, and the Supreme Court in

74. On federalism see generally Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE
L.J. 749 (1999).
75. See Emilio Peluso Neder Meyer & Thomas Bustamante, Authoritarianism Without
Emergency Powers: Brazil Under COVID-19, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://verfassungsblog.de/authoritarianism-without-emergency-powers-brazil-under-covid-19/
[https://perma.cc/9DZH-6SW].

100

Seattle University Law Review SUpra

[Vol. 45:84

Brazil confirmed the power of state governments to implement lockdown
policies.76
Additionally, an exception to such monopoly exists in unitary states
with strong devolution.77 These states contain multilevel structures with
strong decentralized authorities.78 Interestingly, according to Spain’s
organic law 3/1986 the local governments have the emergency power to
implement regulations on public health.79 During the pandemic, when the
number of COVID-19 patients increased drastically, the Regional Premier
did not implement stricter coronavirus regulations; instead, it stayed
inactive “on the basis that they would do further harm to the economy.”80
Against such inaction, the central government enacted restrictions—
such as perimetral lockdowns and early closing times for businesses, and
10 PM curfews for commercial businesses.81 Subsequently, the local
government of Madrid filed an appeal with the national High Court
(known officially as the Tribunal Superior de Justicia Sección Octava de
la Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo) against the restrictions on the
basis that the restrictions encroached on its powers.82 The national High
Court eventually struck down the restrictions.83
As a response, the central government of Spain used an alternative
legal route to implement the emergency regulations. It activated the state
of alarm provision of the Constitution84 to re-enact the exact same
76. Jen Kirby, Jair Bolsonaro Undermined Brazil’s Coronavirus Response. Now There’s a
Political Crisis, VOX (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/28/21228512/brazil-bolsonarocoronavirus-moro [https://perma.cc/W3JY-J49Z].
77. On the devolution in Spain see Xabier Arzoz, Extent and Limits of Devolution in Spain, 25
EUR. PUB. L. 83, 83 (2019).
78. Id.
79. Artículo 3 de la Ley Orgánica 3/1986, de 14 de abril, de Medidas Especiales en Materia de
Salud Pública (all translations done by the author).
80. Simon Hunter, Madrid High Court Strikes Down Health Ministry’s Coronavirus
Restrictions, EL PAÍS (Oct. 8, 2020), https://english.elpais.com/society/2020-10-08/madrid-highcourt-strikes-down-health-ministrys-coronavirus-restrictions.html [https://perma.cc/MDG9-BD2K].
81. Order 1273/2020, of October 1, of the Ministry of Health (Orden 1273/2020, de 1 de octubre,
de la Consejería de Sanidad).
82. High Court of Justice, Eighth Section of the Contentious-Administrative Chamber 128/2020
(Tribunal Superior de Justicia. Sección Octava de la Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo 128/2020;
El TSJ de Madrid Deniega la Ratificación de las ‘Medidas Covid’ al Afectar la Orden Comunicada
del Ministro de Sanidad Derechos Fundamentales, PODER JUDICIAL ESPANA (Oct. 8, 2020),
https://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Poder-Judicial/Noticias-Judiciales/El-TSJ-de-Madrid-deniegala-ratificacion-de-las—medidas-Covid—al-afectar-la-Orden-comunicada-del-ministro-de-Sanidadderechos-fundamentales [https://perma.cc/9D59-G6W9].
83. El TSJ de Madrid Deniega la Ratificación de las ‘Medidas Covid’ al Afectar la Orden
Comunicada del Ministro de Sanidad Derechos Fundamentales, PODER JUDICIAL ESPANA (Oct. 8,
2020), https://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Poder-Judicial/Noticias-Judiciales/El-TSJ-de-Madriddeniega-la-ratificacion-de-las—medidas-Covid—al-afectar-la-Orden-comunicada-del-ministro-deSanidad-derechos-fundamentales [https://perma.cc/9D59-G6W9].
84. See CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [C.E.] [CONSTITUION] B.O.E. n.116, Dec. 27, 1978 (Spain).

2022]

Inaction as a State Response

101

measures found in the original restrictions and overcome the inaction from
the local government.85
Therefore, what federalism and devolution teach us about times of
emergency is the utility of the two-tier duopoly of the emergency powers
between the central government and the decentralized authorities. Such
duopoly might solve the problem of emergency omission that occurs when
the executive chooses to remain inactive. If one tier of authority stays
inactive, the other tier of authority can activate the emergency regime and
enact emergency regulations, as was seen to be successful in Brazil and
Spain.86
2. The Role of Judicial Review and Its Limitations
Apart from the alternative institutional response to emergency
omission seen in duopoly systems, people can use judicial review to
compel action. To begin, governments have discretion to how or whether
to respond to an emergency.87 Both affirmative acts and omissions are
causes of action subject to judicial review.88
However, two issues relevant to the judicial review of emergency
omission are worth touching on. First, judges tend to show deference to
the government in times of emergency. Second, judges are more likely to
85. On October 9, 2020, the Ministry of the Presidency issued a Royal Decree, which declares
“the state of alarm to respond to situations of special risk due to uncontrolled transmission of infections
caused by SARS-CoV-2.” See REAL DECRETCO, B.O.E 2020, 268 (BOE-A-2020-12109) (Spain) (all
translations done by the author).
86. In addition, the multilevel governance has the benefit that a dialogue is created between the
central government and the decentralized authorities. Moreover, it is probable that emergency
regulations enacted by different tier of government, complement each other. Finally, it is probable that
emergency experiments take place as emergency regulations enacted at a local level are tested and the
most efficient in the end would prevail.
87. Jocelyn Stacey, The Environmental Emergency and the Legality of Discretion in
Environmental Law, 52 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 985, 991 (2016).
88. In general, on the justiciable nature of discretion, Craig has accurately pointed out the
position of the U.K. and U.S. Courts. In particular Craig remarked that
[t]he mere presence of some species of discretion does not entail the conclusion that the
matter is thereby non-justiciable. In the United States, it was once argued that the very
existence of discretion rendered the decision immune from negligence. As one court
scathingly said of such an argument, there can be discretion even in the hammering of a
nail. Discretionary judgments made by public bodies, which the courts feel able to assess,
should not therefore preclude the existence of negligence liability. This does not mean that
the presence of such discretion will be irrelevant to the determination of liability. It will be
of relevance in deciding whether there has been a breach of the duty of care. It is for this
reason that the decisions in Barrett and Phelps are to be welcomed. Their Lordships
recognized that justiciable discretionary choices would be taken into account in deciding
whether the defendant had acted in breach of the duty of care. There may also be cases
where some allegations of negligence are thought to be non-justiciable, while others may
be felt suited to judicial resolution in accordance with the normal rules on breach.
PAUL CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 898 (4th ed., 2003).
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find state authorities liable and accountable before the courts for
misfeasance but not for non-feasance. The combination of these two
limitations makes it less probable for citizens to compel action via the
courts. The part below will analyze these two inherent limitations
pertaining to the judicial review of emergency omission.
First, there is voluminous literature on the practice of deference.89 In
2008, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the case Dunsmuir v New
Brunswick, defined the term deference as follows:
[B]oth an attitude of the court and a requirement of the law of judicial
review. It does not mean that courts are subservient to the
determinations of decision makers, or that courts must show blind
reverence to their interpretations, or that they may be content to pay
lip service to the concept of reasonableness review while in fact
imposing their own view. Rather, deference imports respect for the
decision-making process of adjudicative bodies with regard to both
the facts and the law. The notion of deference “is rooted in part in a
respect for governmental decisions to create administrative bodies
with delegated powers” . . . Deference in the context of the
reasonableness standard therefore implies that courts will give due
consideration to the determinations of decision makers.90

Courts show deference to the government’s political branches,
especially in times of crisis when the decision-making process requires
expertise. For instance, in the U.S., a sound practice of deference is
established during times of emergency91 while such practice has migrated
to a plethora of countries, such as Argentina,92 Australia,93 the Czech

89. See generally T.R.S. Allan, Deference, Defiance, and Doctrine: Defining the Limits of
Judicial Review, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 41 (2010); Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference
to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908 (2017).
90. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.R. 190, 221 (Can.) (internal citations omitted).
91. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, Institutional Alternatives to Judicial
Deference in TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 161–81 (2007).
92. Pedro Aberastury, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Argentina, in
DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 23, 23–36 (Guobin Zhu ed., 2019).
93. Fleur Kingham, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Australia, in
DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL Review 39, 39–83 (Guobin Zhu ed., 2019).
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Republic,94 Denmark,95 Finland,96 and Greece.97 In principle, emergency
regulations are political actions; therefore, the judicial branch does not
intervene; however, in reality, this has not and will not occur.98
Second, a neglected aspect of the judicial deference pertains to
administrative omissions. Courts’ institutional positioning in the
separation of powers system often makes them reluctant to intervene in
non-feasance or omission cases. From a structural perspective, the court’s
role in the separation of powers system is purely defensive, for instance,
to block actions hindering human rights, but they lack a creative dimension
such as the ability to propose solutions and a course of action. If the
judiciary prescribes the course of action, such decision resembles an
executive function. Therefore, courts would substitute the political
branches of the government in decision making.99
This reluctance to encroach on the role of executive function was
enshrined in the US Supreme Court Case, Juliana v. United States.100 In
this case the plaintiffs alleged that climate-change related injuries “caused
by the federal government continuing to ‘permit, authorize, and subsidize’
fossil fuel . . . and sought declaratory relief and an injunction ordering the
government to implement a plan to ‘phase out fossil fuel emissions and
draw down excess atmospheric [carbon dioxide].’”101 The majority
rejected the claim on standing grounds102 holding in the obiter dictum (as
an incidental statement) that the case posed a political question and that
the judiciary was not equipped to provide an effective remedy.103 It noted
that:
94. Zdenek Kühn & Josef Staša, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in the Czech
Republic, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 133, 133–154 (Guobin Zhu
ed., 2019).
95. Bent Ole Gram Mortensen & Frederik Waage, Deference to the Administration in Judicial
Review in Denmark, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 157, 157–162
(Guobin Zhu ed., 2019).
96. Olli Mäenpää, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Finland, in DEFERENCE
TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 181, 181–200 (Guobin Zhu ed., 2019).
97. Antonios Kouroutakis & Despina Glarou, Der Ökonomische Ausnahmezustand in
Griechenland, in AUSNAHMEZUSTAND: THEORIEGESCHICHTE–ANWENDUNGEN–PERSPEKTIVEN 199
(Matthias Lemke ed., 2017).
98. For instance about the deference shown in times of emergency by U.K. Courts, see generally
John Ip, The Supreme Court and the House of Lords in the War on Terror: Inter Arma Silent Leges?,
19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010).
99. This argument resembles the discourse pertaining to the enforceability of social rights. For
more details see MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 227 (2008); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 221 (2002).
100. See generally Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
101. Id. at 1164.
102. Id. at 1174.
103. Id. at 1164–65, 1175.
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The plaintiffs have made a compelling case that action is needed; it
will be increasingly difficult in light of that record for the political
branches to deny that climate change is occurring, that the
government has had a role in causing it, and that our elected officials
have a moral responsibility to seek solutions. We do not dispute that
the broad judicial relief the plaintiffs seek could well goad the
political branches into action. . . . We reluctantly conclude, however,
that the plaintiffs’ case must be made to the political branches or to
the electorate at large, the latter of which can change the composition
of the political branches through the ballot box. That the other
branches may have abdicated their responsibility to remediate the
problem does not confer on Article III courts, no matter how wellintentioned, the ability to step into their shoes.104

The treatment of state authorities’ omission is indicative of how
emergency omission might be treated. In the light of the precedent from
the US Supreme Court on state authorities’ omission, a fortiori emergency
omission is an issue that courts would likely be reluctant to dictate action
to the executive. In particular, in the case DeShaney v. Winnebago County,
which was a case about the liability of the Department of Social Services
due to inaction,105 the court acknowledged that “our cases have recognized
that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life,
liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not
deprive the individual.”106 Under this reasoning courts would likely find
that they lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate whether an executive omission
was improper.
Moreover, in the U.K., the judiciary has confirmed that omissions
are legally different from positive acts in many cases.107 In particular, the
conduct of inaction must violate a public authority duty to act based on a
statutory provision, which will substantiate the negligence.108 The
challenge is that to hold public authorities liable one must prove a nexus
exists between the inaction of the public authorities and the harm
caused.109 Additionally, a key issue underlies the problem as it is up for
debate whether private entities can bring a claim against the government
at all.

104. Id. at 1175 (internal citations omitted).
105. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 192–93 (1989).
106. Id. at 196.
107. Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4 [4550]
108. Stovin v. Wise [1996] AC 923 (HL) [28] (appeal taken from HM).
109. Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310, 632F.
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Pertaining to the duty to act, Stovin v. Wise is a seminal decision
distinguishing between statutory power and statutory duty.110 The Court
held that the presence of a duty to care does not automatically mean there
is a duty to act and thus a failure to exercise a statutory power, does not
necessarily mean that there is rise for a claim for damages.111
Furthermore, recent case law is illustrative and instructive on
whether private entities can bring a claim against the government. In the
case Gorringe v. Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council the claimant
sought damages after a road accident. 112 The main argument was whether
the highway authority was liable for its omission to mark a road with a
warning about the need to slow down.113 Lord Hofmman stated the
following: “whether [the statute] was intended to give rise to a private right
of action depends upon the construction of the statute.”114 And he
concluded that the statute did not create a duty to act, on the other hand
Lord Scott remarked that the statute “cannot possibly be construed so as
to justify the conclusion that a private action in damages can be brought
for breach of the statutory duty.”115
Moreover, the obiter dictum comes to confirm what at the theoretical
level is argued, that omissions are legally different from positive acts. In
particular, Lord Steyn remarked that “the courts must not contribute to the
creation of a society bent on litigation, which is premised on the illusion
that for every misfortune there is a remedy”116 and Lord Scott said:
[A]n overriding imperative is that those who drive on public
highways do so in a manner and at a speed that is safe having regard
to such matters as the nature of the road, the weather conditions and
the traffic conditions. Drivers are first and foremost themselves
responsible for their own safety.117

As a conclusion, according to the legal precedent in the U.K., state
authorities are probably more liable and accountable before the courts for
misfeasance but not for non-feasance.

110. Stovin v. Wise [1996] AC 923 (HL) [4] (appeal taken from HM).
111. In particular, Lord Hoffmann observed that “I think that the minimum pre-conditions for
basing a duty of care upon the existence of a statutory power, if it can be done at all, are, first, that it
would in the circumstances have been irrational not to have exercised the power, so that there was in
effect a public law duty to act, and secondly, that there are exceptional grounds for holding that the
policy of the statute requires compensation to be paid to persons who suffer loss because the power
was not exercised.” Id. at [28].
112. Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15 (HL) [7].
113. Id. at 8.
114. Id. at 23.
115. Id. at 54.
116. Id. at 2.
117. Id. at 76.
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That said, the previous two parts show that the features of judicial
review in relation to emergency omission make judicial review less
effective. The first is the well-established and widespread practice of
deference in times of emergency, and the second is omission as an aspect
of regulation is subject to a distinct approach from the courts. To offer an
effective mechanism to compel action, judicial review should show more
activism and treat both acts and omissions in like manner.
The recent decision of Brazil’s Supreme Court (known officially as
Supremo Tribunal Federal) contains several interesting obiter dicta about
the emergency omission118. The case was about the constitutionality of a
provisional law signed by President Bolsonaro, which exempted public
agents from punishment for mistakes or omission made in combatting the
COVID-19 virus.119 The law required a gross error or manifest error to
occur in the causal link between a public agent’s conduct and the harmful
result of that conduct.120 The legal effect of this law was to restrict or take
away the possibility of responsibility and liability of public agents during
the pandemic, in reality legalizing emergency omission.
A legal challenge was brought before the Supreme Court arguing that
such a law violates the Constitution because it contradicts the State’s
objective civil liability provision—that is, the public authority is liable for
actions and omissions.121 The Court delivered its judgment and decided to
limit the scope of the provisional law.122 Hence the Court limited the
“provisional measure that frees public agent from punishment during [the]
pandemic.”123

118. Provisional Measure 966/2020 (Medida Provisória nº 966, de 13/05/2020),
https://legislacao.presidencia.gov.br/atos/?tipo=MPV&numero=966&ano=2020&ato=c4coXU65EM
ZpWT91f [https://perma.cc/66PN-GN5N].
119. Id.
120. Id. Article 2 reads as follows:
For the purposes of the provisions of this Provisional Measure, a gross error is a manifest,
evident and inexcusable error practiced with serious fault, characterized by an act or
omission with a high degree of negligence, imprudence or malpractice.” Article 3 reads as
follows: “In assessing the occurrence of gross error, the following will be considered: I the real obstacles and difficulties of the public agent; II - the complexity of the matter and
the powers exercised by the public agent; III - the circumstance of incomplete information
in urgent or emergency situations; IV - the practical circumstances that have imposed,
limited or conditioned the action or inaction of the public agent; and V - the context of
uncertainty about the most appropriate measures to face the Covid-19 pandemic and its
consequences, including economic ones.
121. See in particular CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 37.6 (Braz.) l.
122. See ADI 6.421 MC - Supremo Tribunal Federal.
123. Fernanda Vivas & Márcio Falcão, Supremo Limita Medida Provisória que Livra Agente
Público
de
Punição
Durante
Pandemia
(May
21,
2020),
https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/05/21/maioria-do-stf-vota-por-limitar-mp-que-livraagente-publico-de-punicao-durante-pandemia.ghtml [https://perma.cc/7WD3-8R8P].
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3. Emergency Omission and the Role of Politics
While there are legal mechanisms to compel executive action during
emergencies, political tools are proven to be more efficient.124 To begin
with, in the sphere of politics, emergency inaction is a public policy
choice. It is a political decision to the extent that it is based on expertise
and calculations. Every public policy has effects, which will be assessed
by people and eventually the voters evaluate every public policy during
elections. Accordingly, if people are not satisfied with the emergency
omission, they will oust their representative from office. This is the socalled self-correctness promise of politics.125
However, the weak side in relation to the political mechanism to
compel action is that the people’s voice is heard once elections take place.
This implies that the political remedy might be subject to the constrain of
time and substantially delayed.
In principle, the accountability mechanism in democracies might
work as the more reliable tool to spur action during emergencies and
prevent emergency omission. If governments do not take any emergency
measures during a terrorist attack, civilian casualties will substantially
increase, and if governments do not enact any emergency regulations
during a pandemic, the number of infections in the society by the virus
will be vast. The risk from the emergency omission is so high, and the
possibility of a disaster works as an incentive for action from the different
branches of the government, which are accountable to the people.
All in all, the choice of inaction during an emergency cannot be
disentangled from the broader political questions during elections. And for
the political actors and policymakers, there is no greater punishment for
their policies than political defeat in elections.
CONCLUSION
Because of COVID-19, one country after another enacted emergency
regulations. They had to shut down and restrict cross-border travel, impose
sweeping restrictions on everyday life, and ban public gatherings,
religious ceremonies, and free movement. The pandemic made an ideal
environment for lawyers to compare and contrast the emergency responses
under the same conditions, in particular the same virus with the same

124. For more details in the use of ordinary politics to resolve legal problems and disputes, see
RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY (2007).
125. Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in Democracy and Difference:
Contesting the Boundaries of the Political 23 (Selya Benhabib ed., 1996).
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characteristics.126 However, some countries, especially during the first
wave of the pandemic, decided not to enact emergency measures to curb
the spread of the virus. This inaction revealed the issue of emergency
omission.127
Political theory has traditionally assumed that the executive branch
of a state will take action in emergencies. Therefore, the focus of
scholarship has been on preventing executive overreaction and the
resultant disproportionate burdening of fundamental rights and freedoms.
Emergency omission is caused due to the concentration of
emergency powers to the executive in unitary countries. However, such
deadlock may be avoided if drafters of the constitution draw inspiration
from designing the emergency provisions allocating power to both the
central and decentralized authorities. Such constitutional configuration
would make inaction less probable.
What is novel with the idea of emergency inaction is the possibility
of unconstitutionality by omission, which is linked to whether
infringement on individuals’ rights is possible via state inaction. The
possibility of infringement of rights due to state inaction adds an extra
dimension to the discussion of the infringement of rights via state or
private action.128
However, the courts’ tendency to show deference in times of
emergency,129 together with the fact that government is less likely to be
found liable for non-feasance compared to misfeasance, shows the
inherent limitations of judicial review of emergency omissions.
Emergency omission is a new phenomenon, and it may be
approached with legal and political tools. While the legal tools are subject
to some limitations—for instance, the courts are reluctant to dictate action
to the executive based on separation of powers concerns—the political
tools via the ordinary political process might be more appropriate to spur
action.

126. The core difference, however, existed between countries in the Northern Hemisphere and
countries in the Southern Hemisphere, as the warmer seasons had an impact on the intensity of the
pandemic wave.
127. See supra text accompanying note 60.
128. For instance, in the U.S. the Supreme Court has developed the state action doctrine and its
exceptions, which is about the violation of human rights from state activities vis-à-vis private actors.
Regarding the U.S. see Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102
MICH. L. REV. 387, 412 (2003); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503,
522 (1985).
129. See supra text accompanying note 90.

